The decline of gold
World War I effectively ended the real international gold standard. Most belligerent nations suspended the free convertibility of gold. The United States, even after its entry into the war, maintained convertibility but embargoed gold exports. For a few years after the end of the war, most countries had inconvertible national paper standards—inconvertible in that paper money was not convertible into gold or silver. The exchange rate between any two currencies was a market rate that fluctuated from time to time. This was regarded as a temporary phenomenon, like the British suspension of gold payments during the Napoleonic era or the U.S. suspension during the Civil War greenback period (see Greenback movement). The great aim was a restoration of the prewar gold standard. Since price levels had increased in all countries during the war, countries had to choose deflation or devaluation to restore the gold standard. This effort dominated monetary developments during the 1920s.
Britain, still a major financial power, chose deflation. Winston Churchill, chancellor of the Exchequer in 1925, decided to follow prevailing financial opinion and adopt the prewar parity (i.e., to define a pound sterling once again as equal to 123.274 grains of gold 11/12 fine). This produced exchange rates that, at the existing prices in Britain, overvalued the pound and so tended to produce gold outflows, especially after France chose devaluation and returned to gold in 1928 at a parity that undervalued the franc. By 1929 the important currencies of the world, and most of the less important ones, were again linked to gold.
The gold standard that was restored, however, was a far cry from the prewar gold standard. The establishment of the Federal Reserve System in the United States in 1913 introduced an additional link in the international specie-flow mechanism. That mechanism no longer operated automatically. It operated only if the Federal Reserve chose to let it do so, and the Federal Reserve did not so choose; to prevent domestic prices from rising, it offset the effect on the quantity of money resulting from an increase in gold. (In effect it “sterilized” the monetary effect.)
France made a similar choice. With the franc undervalued, gold flowed to France. The French government sold the foreign exchange for gold, draining gold from Britain and other gold standard countries. The two countries receiving gold, the United States and France, did not permit gold inflows to raise their price levels. Countries that lost gold had to deflate. Thus, the gold exchange standard forced deflation and unemployment on much of the world economy. By the summer of 1929, recessions were under way in Great Britain and Germany. In August the United States joined the recession that became the Great Depression.
In 1931 Japan and Great Britain left the gold standard, followed by the Scandinavian countries and many of the countries in the British Empire, including Canada. The United States followed in 1933, restoring a fixed—but higher—dollar price for gold, $35 an ounce in January 1934, but barring U.S. citizens from owning gold. France, Switzerland, Italy, and Belgium left the gold standard in 1936. Although it was not clear at the time, that was the end of the gold standard.
The Bretton Woods system
During World War II, Great Britain and the United States outlined the postwar monetary system. Their plan, approved by more than 40 countries at the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944, aimed to correct the perceived deficiencies of the interwar gold exchange standard. These included the volatility of floating exchange rates, the inflexibility of fixed exchange rates, and reliance on an adjustment mechanism for countries with payment surpluses or deficits; these problems were often resolved by recession and deflation in deficit countries coupled with expansion and inflation in surplus countries. The agreement that resulted from the conference led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which countries joined by paying a subscription. Members agreed to maintain a system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates. Countries with payment deficits could borrow from the fund, while those with surpluses would lend. If deficits or surpluses persisted, the agreement provided for changes in exchange rates. The IMF began operations in 1947, with the U.S. dollar serving as the fund’s reserve currency and the price of gold fixed at $35 per ounce. The U.S. agreed to maintain that price by buying or selling gold.
Postwar recovery, low inflation, growth of trade and payments, and the buildup of international reserves in industrial countries permitted the new system to come into full operation at the end of 1958. Although a vestigial tie to gold remained with the gold price staying at $35 per ounce, the Bretton Woods system essentially put the market economies of the world on a dollar standard—in other words, the U.S. dollar served as the world’s principal currency, and countries held most of their reserves in interest-bearing dollar securities.
The dollar became the most widely used currency in international trade, even in trade between countries other than the United States. It was the unit in which countries expressed their exchange rate. Countries maintained their “official” exchange rates by buying and selling U.S. dollars and held dollars as their primary reserve currency for that purpose. The existence of a dollar standard did not prevent other countries from changing their exchange rates, just as the gold standard did not prevent other currencies from “devaluing” or “appreciating” in terms of gold. In time, however, the fixed price of gold became increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain. Many countries devalued or revalued their currencies, including major economic powers such as the United Kingdom (in 1967), Germany, and France (both in 1969). Yet in practice the United States was not free to determine its own exchange rate or its balance of payments position. Monetary expansion in the United States provided reserves for other countries; monetary contraction absorbed reserves. Central banks could convert dollars into gold, and they did, especially in the early years. As the stock of dollars held by central banks outside the United States rose and the U.S. gold stock dwindled, the United States could not honour its commitment to convert gold into dollars at the fixed rate of $35 per ounce. The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates appeared doomed. Governments and central banks tried for years to find a way to extend its life, but they could not agree on a solution. The end came on Aug. 15, 1971, when Pres. Richard M. Nixon announced that the United States would no longer sell gold.
