Overview of Event Threat Detection  |  Security Command Center  |  Google Cloud (2024)

Active Scan: Log4j Vulnerable to RCE Unavailable Cloud DNS logs Detects active Log4j vulnerabilities by identifying DNS queries for unobfuscated domains that were initiated by supported Log4j vulnerability scanners. Inhibit System Recovery: Deleted Google Cloud Backup and DR host BACKUP_HOSTS_DELETE_HOST Cloud Audit Logs:
Backup and DR Service Data Access logs A host was deleted from Backup and DR. Applications that are associated with the deleted host might not be protected. Data Destruction: Google Cloud Backup and DR expire image BACKUP_EXPIRE_IMAGE Cloud Audit Logs:
Backup and DR Data Access logs A user requested the deletion of a backup image from Backup and DR. The deletion of a backup image does not prevent future backups. Inhibit System Recovery: Google Cloud Backup and DR remove plan BACKUP_REMOVE_PLAN Cloud Audit Logs:
Backup and DR Data Access logs A backup plan with multiple policies for an application was deleted from Backup and DR. The deletion of a backup plan can prevent future backups. Data Destruction: Google Cloud Backup and DR expire all images BACKUP_EXPIRE_IMAGES_ALL Cloud Audit Logs:
Backup and DR Data Access logs A user requested the deletion of all backup images for a protected application from Backup and DR. The deletion of backup images does not prevent future backups. Inhibit System Recovery: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete template BACKUP_TEMPLATES_DELETE_TEMPLATE Cloud Audit Logs:
Backup and DR Data Access logs A predefined backup template, which is used to set up backups for multiple applications, was deleted. The ability to set up backups in the future might be impacted. Inhibit System Recovery: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete policy BACKUP_TEMPLATES_DELETE_POLICY Cloud Audit Logs:
Backup and DR Data Access logs A Backup and DR policy, which defines how a backup is taken and where it is stored, was deleted. Future backups that use the policy might fail. Inhibit System Recovery: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete profile BACKUP_PROFILES_DELETE_PROFILE Cloud Audit Logs:
Backup and DR Data Access logs A Backup and DR profile, which defines which storage pools should be used to store backups, was deleted. Future backups that use the profile might fail. Data Destruction: Google Cloud Backup and DR remove appliance BACKUP_APPLIANCES_REMOVE_APPLIANCE Cloud Audit Logs:
Backup and DR Data Access logs A backup appliance was deleted from Backup and DR. Applications that are associated with the deleted backup appliance might not be protected. Inhibit System Recovery: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete storage pool BACKUP_STORAGE_POOLS_DELETE Cloud Audit Logs:
Backup and DR Data Access logs A storage pool, which associates a Cloud Storage bucket with Backup and DR, has been removed from Backup and DR. Future backups to this storage target will fail. Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR reduced backup expiration BACKUP_REDUCE_BACKUP_EXPIRATION Cloud Audit Logs:
Backup and DR Data Access logs The expiration date for a backup protected by Backup and DR has been reduced. Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR reduced backup frequency BACKUP_REDUCE_BACKUP_FREQUENCY Cloud Audit Logs:
Backup and DR Data Access logs The Backup and DR backup schedule has been modified to reduce backup frequency. Brute force SSH BRUTE_FORCE_SSH authlog Detection of successful brute force of SSH on a host. Cloud IDS: THREAT_IDENTIFIER Preview CLOUD_IDS_THREAT_ACTIVITY Cloud IDS logs Events that are detected by Cloud IDS. Cloud IDS detects layer 7 attacks by analyzing mirrored packets and, when an event is detected, sends a finding to Security Command Center. Finding category names start with "Cloud IDS" followed by the Cloud IDS threat identifier. To learn more about Cloud IDS detections, see Cloud IDS Logging information.
Credential Access: External Member Added To Privileged Group EXTERNAL_MEMBER_ADDED_TO_PRIVILEGED_GROUP Google Workspace Logs:
Login Audit
Permissions:
DATA_READ

Detects events where an external member is added to a privileged Google Group (a group granted sensitive roles or permissions). A finding is generated only if the group doesn't already contain other external members from the same organization as the newly added member. To learn more, see Unsafe Google Group changes.

Findings are classified as High or Medium severity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles associated with the group change. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Credential Access: Privileged Group Opened To Public PRIVILEGED_GROUP_OPENED_TO_PUBLIC Google Workspace:
Admin Audit
Permissions:
DATA_READ

Detects events where a privileged Google Group (a group granted sensitive roles or permissions) is changed to be accessible to the general public. To learn more, see Unsafe Google Group changes.

Findings are classified as High or Medium severity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles associated with the group change. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Credential Access: Sensitive Role Granted To Hybrid Group SENSITIVE_ROLE_TO_GROUP_WITH_EXTERNAL_MEMBER Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs

Detects events where sensitive roles are granted to a Google Group with external members. To learn more, see Unsafe Google Group changes.

Findings are classified as High or Medium severity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles associated with the group change. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Defense Evasion: Breakglass Workload Deployment CreatedPreview BINARY_AUTHORIZATION_BREAKGLASS_WORKLOAD_CREATE Cloud Audit Logs:
Admin Activity logs Detects the deployment of workloads that are deployed by using the break-glass flag to override Binary Authorization controls. Defense Evasion: Breakglass Workload Deployment UpdatedPreview BINARY_AUTHORIZATION_BREAKGLASS_WORKLOAD_UPDATE Cloud Audit Logs:
Admin Activity logs Detects when workloads are updated by using the break-glass flag to override Binary Authorization controls. Defense Evasion: Modify VPC Service Control DEFENSE_EVASION_MODIFY_VPC_SERVICE_CONTROL Cloud Audit Logs VPC Service Controls audit logs

Detects a change to an existing VPC Service Controls perimeter that would lead to a reduction in the protection offered by that perimeter.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Discovery: Can get sensitive Kubernetes object check GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_CAN_GET_SENSITIVE_OBJECT Cloud Audit Logs:
GKE Data Access logs

A potentially malicious actor attempted to determine what sensitive objects in GKE they can query for, by using the kubectl auth can-i get command. Specifically, the rule detects whether the actor checked for API access on the following objects:

Discovery: Service Account Self-Investigation SERVICE_ACCOUNT_SELF_INVESTIGATION Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Data Access audit logs
Permissions:
DATA_READ

Detection of an IAM service account credential that is used to investigate the roles and permissions associated with that same service account.

Sensitive roles

Findings are classified as High or Medium severity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles granted. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions.

Evasion: Access from Anonymizing Proxy ANOMALOUS_ACCESS Cloud Audit Logs:
Admin Activity logs Detection of Google Cloud service modifications that originated from anonymous proxy IP addresses, like Tor IP addresses. Exfiltration: BigQuery Data Exfiltration DATA_EXFILTRATION_BIG_QUERY Cloud Audit Logs: BigQueryAuditMetadata data access logs
Permissions:
DATA_READ Detects the following scenarios:
  • Resources owned by the protected organization that are saved outside of the organization, including copy or transfer operations.

    This scenario is indicated by a subrule of exfil_to_external_table and a severity of HIGH.

  • Attempts to access BigQuery resources that are protected by VPC Service Controls.

    This scenario is indicated by a subrule of vpc_perimeter_violation and a severity of LOW.

Exfiltration: BigQuery Data Extraction DATA_EXFILTRATION_BIG_QUERY_EXTRACTION Cloud Audit Logs: BigQueryAuditMetadata data access logs
Permissions:
DATA_READ Detects the following scenarios:
  • A BigQuery resource owned by the protected organization is saved, through extraction operations, to a Cloud Storage bucket outside the organization.
  • A BigQuery resource owned by the protected organization is saved, through extraction operations, to a publicly accessible Cloud Storage bucket owned by that organization.

For project-level activations of the Security Command Center Premium tier,this finding is available only if the Standard tier is enabled in theparent organization.

Exfiltration: BigQuery Data to Google Drive DATA_EXFILTRATION_BIG_QUERY_TO_GOOGLE_DRIVE Cloud Audit Logs: BigQueryAuditMetadata data access logs
Permissions:
DATA_READ Detects the following:
  • A BigQuery resource owned by the protected organization is saved, through extraction operations, to a Google Drive folder.
Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Data Exfiltration
CLOUDSQL_EXFIL_EXPORT_TO_EXTERNAL_GCS
CLOUDSQL_EXFIL_EXPORT_TO_PUBLIC_GCS
Cloud Audit Logs: MySQL data access logs
PostgreSQL data access logs
SQL Server data access logs Detects the following scenarios:
  • Live instance data exported to a Cloud Storage bucket outside of the organization.
  • Live instance data exported to a Cloud Storage bucket that is owned by the organization and is publicly accessible.

For project-level activations of the Security Command Center Premium tier,this finding is available only if the Standard tier is enabled in theparent organization.

Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Restore Backup to External Organization CLOUDSQL_EXFIL_RESTORE_BACKUP_TO_EXTERNAL_INSTANCE Cloud Audit Logs: MySQL admin activity logs
PostgreSQL admin activity logs
SQL Server admin activity logs

Detects events where the backup of a Cloud SQL instance is restored to an instance outside of the organization.

Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Over-Privileged Grant CLOUDSQL_EXFIL_USER_GRANTED_ALL_PERMISSIONS Cloud Audit Logs: PostgreSQL data access logs
Note: You must enable the pgAudit extension to use this rule.

Detects events where a Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL user or role has been granted all privileges to a database, or to all tables, procedures, or functions in a schema.

Initial Access: Database Superuser Writes to User Tables CLOUDSQL_SUPERUSER_WRITES_TO_USER_TABLES Cloud Audit Logs: Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL data access logs
Cloud SQL for MySQL data access logs
Note: You must enable the pgAudit extension for PostgreSQL or database auditing for MySQL to use this rule.

Detects events where a Cloud SQL superuser (postgres for PostgreSQL servers or root for MySQL users) writes to non-system tables.

Privilege Escalation: AlloyDB Over-Privileged Grant ALLOYDB_USER_GRANTED_ALL_PERMISSIONS Cloud Audit Logs: AlloyDB for PostgreSQL data access logs
Note: You must enable the pgAudit extension to use this rule.

Detects events where an AlloyDB for PostgreSQL user or role has been granted all privileges to a database, or to all tables, procedures, or functions in a schema.

Privilege Escalation: AlloyDB Database Superuser Writes to User Tables ALLOYDB_SUPERUSER_WRITES_TO_USER_TABLES Cloud Audit Logs: AlloyDB for PostgreSQL data access logs
Note: You must enable the pgAudit extension to use this rule.

Detects events where an AlloyDB for PostgreSQL superuser (postgres) writes to non-system tables.

Initial Access: Dormant Service Account Action DORMANT_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_USED_IN_ACTION Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs

Detects events where a dormant user-managed service account triggered an action. In this context, a service account is considered dormant if it has been inactive for more than 180 days.

Privilege Escalation: Dormant Service Account Granted Sensitive Role DORMANT_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ADDED_IN_IAM_ROLE Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs

Detects events where a dormant user-managed service account was granted one or more sensitive IAM roles. In this context, a service account is considered dormant if it has been inactive for more than 180 days.

Sensitive roles

Findings are classified as High or Medium severity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles granted. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions.

Persistence: Impersonation Role Granted For Dormant Service Account DORMANT_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_IMPERSONATION_ROLE_GRANTED Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs

Detects events where a principal is granted permissions to impersonate a dormant user-managed service account. In this context, a service account is considered dormant if it has been inactive for more than 180 days.

Initial Access: Dormant Service Account Key Created DORMANT_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY_CREATED Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs

Detects events where a key is created for a dormant user-managed service account. In this context, a service account is considered dormant if it has been inactive for more than 180 days.

Initial Access: Leaked Service Account Key Used LEAKED_SA_KEY_USED Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs
Data Access logs

Detects events where a leaked service account key is used to authenticate the action. In this context, a leaked service account key is one that was posted on the public internet.

Initial Access: Excessive Permission Denied Actions EXCESSIVE_FAILED_ATTEMPT Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs

Detects events where a principal repeatedly triggers permission denied errors by attempting changes across multiple methods and services.

Impair Defenses: Strong Authentication Disabled ENFORCE_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION Google Workspace:
Admin Audit 2-step verification was disabled for the organization.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Impair Defenses: Two Step Verification Disabled 2SV_DISABLE Google Workspace Logs:
Login Audit
Permissions:
DATA_READ A user disabled 2-step verification.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Initial Access: Account Disabled Hijacked ACCOUNT_DISABLED_HIJACKED Google Workspace Logs:
Login Audit
Permissions:
DATA_READ A user's account was suspended due to suspicious activity.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Initial Access: Disabled Password Leak ACCOUNT_DISABLED_PASSWORD_LEAK Google Workspace Logs:
Login Audit
Permissions:
DATA_READ A user's account is disabled because a password leak was detected.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Initial Access: Government Based Attack GOV_ATTACK_WARNING Google Workspace Logs:
Login Audit
Permissions:
DATA_READ Government-backed attackers might have tried to compromise a user account or computer.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Initial Access: Log4j Compromise Attempt Unavailable Cloud Load Balancing Logs:
Cloud HTTP Load Balancer
Note: You must enable external Application Load Balancer logging to use this rule. Detects Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI) lookups within headers or URL parameters. These lookups may indicate attempts at Log4Shell exploitation. These findings have low severity, because they only indicate a detection or exploit attempt, not a vulnerability or a compromise.
This rule is always on. Initial Access: Suspicious Login Blocked SUSPICIOUS_LOGIN Google Workspace Logs:
Login Audit
Permissions:
DATA_READ A suspicious login to a user's account was detected and blocked.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Log4j Malware: Bad Domain LOG4J_BAD_DOMAIN Cloud DNS logs Detection of Log4j exploit traffic based on a connection to, or a lookup of, a known domain used in Log4j attacks. Log4j Malware: Bad IP LOG4J_BAD_IP VPC flow logs
Firewall Rules logs
Cloud NAT logs Detection of Log4j exploit traffic based on a connection to a known IP address used in Log4j attacks. Malware: bad domain MALWARE_BAD_DOMAIN Cloud DNS logs Detection of malware based on a connection to, or a lookup of, a known bad domain. Malware: bad IP MALWARE_BAD_IP VPC flow logs
Firewall Rules logs
Cloud NAT logs Detection of malware based on a connection to a known bad IP address. Malware: Cryptomining Bad Domain CRYPTOMINING_POOL_DOMAIN Cloud DNS logs Detection of cryptomining based on a connection to, or a lookup of, a known mining domain. Malware: Cryptomining Bad IP CRYPTOMINING_POOL_IP VPC flow logs
Firewall Rules logs
Cloud NAT logs Detection of cryptomining based on a connection to a known mining IP address. Outgoing DoS OUTGOING_DOS VPC flow logs Detection of outgoing denial of service traffic.
Persistence: GCE Admin Added SSH Key GCE_ADMIN_ADD_SSH_KEY Cloud Audit Logs:
Compute Engine audit logs Detection of a modification to the Compute Engine instance metadata ssh key value on an established instance (older than 1 week).
Persistence: GCE Admin Added Startup Script GCE_ADMIN_ADD_STARTUP_SCRIPT Cloud Audit Logs:
Compute Engine audit logs Detection of a modification to the Compute Engine instance metadata startup script value on an established instance (older than 1 week).
Persistence: IAM Anomalous Grant IAM_ANOMALOUS_GRANT Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs

This finding includes subrules that provide more specific information about each instance of this finding.

The following list shows all possible subrules:

  • external_service_account_added_to_policy, external_member_added_to_policy: Detection of privileges granted to IAM users and service accounts that are not members of your organization or, if Security Command Center is activated at the project level only, your project. Note: If Security Command Center is activated at the organization level at any tier, then this detector uses an organization's existing IAM policies as context. If Security Command Center activation is only at the project level, then the detector uses only the project's IAM policies as context. If a sensitive IAM grant to an external member occurs, and there are less than three existing IAM policies that are similar to it, this detector generates a finding.

    Sensitive roles

    Findings are classified as High or Medium severity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles granted. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions.

  • external_member_invited_to_policy: Detects when an external member is invited as the owner of the project through the InsertProjectOwnershipInvite API.
  • custom_role_given_sensitive_permissions: Detects when the setIAMPolicy permission is added to a custom role.
  • service_account_granted_sensitive_role_to_member: Detects when privileged roles are granted to members through a service account. This subrule is triggered by a subset of sensitive roles that include only basic IAM roles and certain data storage roles. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions
  • policy_modified_by_default_compute_service_account: Detects when a default Compute Engine service account is used to modify project IAM settings
PreviewPersistence: Unmanaged Account Granted Sensitive Role
UNMANAGED_ACCOUNT_ADDED_IN_IAM_ROLE Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detection of a sensitive role being granted to an unmanaged account. Persistence: New API Method
ANOMALOUS_BEHAVIOR_NEW_API_METHOD Cloud Audit Logs:
Admin Activity logs Detection of anomalous usage of Google Cloud services by IAM service accounts. Persistence: New Geography
IAM_ANOMALOUS_BEHAVIOR_IP_GEOLOCATION Cloud Audit Logs:
Admin Activity logs Detection of IAM user and service accounts accessing Google Cloud from anomalous locations, based on the geolocation of the requesting IP addresses.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Persistence: New User Agent IAM_ANOMALOUS_BEHAVIOR_USER_AGENT Cloud Audit Logs:
Admin Activity logs Detection of IAM service accounts accessing Google Cloud from anomalous or suspicious user agents.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Persistence: SSO Enablement Toggle TOGGLE_SSO_ENABLED Google Workspace:
Admin Audit The Enable SSO (single sign-on) setting on the admin account was disabled.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Persistence: SSO Settings Changed CHANGE_SSO_SETTINGS Google Workspace:
Admin Audit The SSO settings for the admin account were changed.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Impersonation of Service Account for Admin Activity ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_IMPERSONATION_OF_SA_ADMIN_ACTIVITY Cloud Audit Logs:
Admin Activity logs Detects when a potentially anomalous impersonated service account is used for an administrative activity. Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Multistep Service Account Delegation for Admin Activity ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_MULTISTEP_ADMIN_ACTIVITY Cloud Audit Logs:
Admin Activity logs Detects when an anomalous multistep delegated request is found for an administrative activity. Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Multistep Service Account Delegation for Data Access ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_MULTISTEP_DATA_ACCESS Cloud Audit Logs:
Data Access logs Detects when an anomalous multistep delegated request is found for a data access activity. Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Service Account Impersonator for Admin Activity ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_IMPERSONATOR_ADMIN_ACTIVITY Cloud Audit Logs:
Admin Activity logs Detects when a potentially anomalous caller/impersonator in a delegation chain is used for an administrative activity. Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Service Account Impersonator for Data Access ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_IMPERSONATOR_DATA_ACCESS Cloud Audit Logs:
Data Access logs Detects when a potentially anomalous caller/impersonator in a delegation chain is used for a data access activity. Privilege Escalation: Changes to sensitive Kubernetes RBAC objects GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_EDIT_SENSITIVE_RBAC_OBJECT Cloud Audit Logs:
GKE Admin Activity logs To escalate privilege, a potentially malicious actor attempted to modify a ClusterRole, RoleBinding, or ClusterRoleBinding role-based access control (RBAC) object of the sensitive cluster-admin role by using a PUT or PATCH request. Privilege Escalation: Create Kubernetes CSR for master cert GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_CSR_FOR_MASTER_CERT Cloud Audit Logs:
GKE Admin Activity logs A potentially malicious actor created a Kubernetes master certificate signing request (CSR), which gives them cluster-admin access. Privilege Escalation: Creation of sensitive Kubernetes bindings GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_CREATE_SENSITIVE_BINDING Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs To escalate privilege, a potentially malicious actor attempted to create a new RoleBinding or ClusterRoleBinding object for the cluster-admin role. Privilege Escalation: Get Kubernetes CSR with compromised bootstrap credentials GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_GET_CSR_WITH_COMPROMISED_BOOTSTRAP_CREDENTIALS Cloud Audit Logs:
GKE Data Access logs A potentially malicious actor queried for a certificate signing request (CSR), with the kubectl command, using compromised bootstrap credentials. Privilege Escalation: Launch of privileged Kubernetes container GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_LAUNCH_PRIVILEGED_CONTAINER Cloud Audit Logs:
GKE Admin Activity logs

A potentially malicious actor created a Pod that contains privileged containers or containers with privilege escalation capabilities.

A privileged container has the privileged field set to true. A container with privilege escalation capabilities has the allowPrivilegeEscalation field set to true. For more information, see the SecurityContext v1 core API reference in the Kubernetes documentation.

Persistence: Service Account Key Created SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY_CREATION Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects the creation of a service account key. Service account keys are long-lived credentials that increase the risk of unauthorized access to Google Cloud resources. Privilege Escalation: Global Shutdown Script Added GLOBAL_SHUTDOWN_SCRIPT_ADDED Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects when a global shutdown script is added to a project. Persistence: Global Startup Script Added GLOBAL_STARTUP_SCRIPT_ADDED Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects when a global startup script is added to a project. Defense Evasion: Organization-Level Service Account Token Creator Role Added ORG_LEVEL_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN_CREATOR_ROLE_ADDED Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects when the Service Account Token Creator IAM role is granted at the organization level. Defense Evasion: Project-Level Service Account Token Creator Role Added PROJECT_LEVEL_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN_CREATOR_ROLE_ADDED Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects when the Service Account Token Creator IAM role is granted at the project level. Lateral Movement: OS Patch Execution From Service Account OS_PATCH_EXECUTION_FROM_SERVICE_ACCOUNT Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects when a service account uses the Compute Engine Patch feature to update the operating system of any currently running Compute Engine instance. Lateral Movement: Modified Boot Disk Attached to Instance Preview MODIFY_BOOT_DISK_ATTACH_TO_INSTANCE Cloud Audit Logs:
Compute Engine audit logs Detects when a boot disk is detached from one Compute Engine instance and attached to another, which could indicate a malicious attempt to compromise the system using a modified boot disk. Credential Access: Secrets Accessed In Kubernetes Namespace SECRETS_ACCESSED_IN_KUBERNETES_NAMESPACE Cloud Audit Logs:
GKE Data Access logs Detects when secrets or service account tokens are accessed by a service account in the current Kubernetes namespace. Resource Development: Offensive Security Distro Activity OFFENSIVE_SECURITY_DISTRO_ACTIVITY Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects successful Google Cloud resource manipulations from known penetration testing or offensive security distros. Privilege Escalation: New Service Account is Owner or Editor SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EDITOR_OWNER Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects when a new service account is created with Editor or Owner roles for a project. Discovery: Information Gathering Tool Used INFORMATION_GATHERING_TOOL_USED Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects the use of ScoutSuite, a cloud security auditing tool that is known to be used by threat actors. Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Token Generation SUSPICIOUS_TOKEN_GENERATION_IMPLICIT_DELEGATION Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects when the iam.serviceAccounts.implicitDelegation permission is abused to generate access tokens from a more privileged service account. Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Token Generation SUSPICIOUS_TOKEN_GENERATION_SIGN_JWT Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects when a service account uses the serviceAccounts.signJwt method to generate an access token for another service account. Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Token Generation SUSPICIOUS_TOKEN_GENERATION_CROSS_PROJECT_OPENID Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects cross-project use of the iam.serviceAccounts.getOpenIdToken IAM permission.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Token Generation SUSPICIOUS_TOKEN_GENERATION_CROSS_PROJECT_ACCESS_TOKEN Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects cross-project use of the iam.serviceAccounts.getAccessToken IAM permission.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Cross-Project Permission Use SUSPICIOUS_CROSS_PROJECT_PERMISSION_DATAFUSION Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects cross-project use of the datafusion.instances.create IAM permission.

This finding isn't available for project-level activations.

Command and Control: DNS Tunneling DNS_TUNNELING_IODINE_HANDSHAKE Cloud DNS logs Detects the handshake of the DNS tunneling tool Iodine. Defense Evasion: VPC Route Masquerade Attempt VPC_ROUTE_MASQUERADE Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects the manual creation of VPC routes masquerading as Google Cloud default routes, allowing egress traffic to external IP addresses. Impact: Billing Disabled BILLING_DISABLED_SINGLE_PROJECT Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects when billing has been disabled for a project. Impact: Billing Disabled BILLING_DISABLED_MULTIPLE_PROJECTS Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects when billing has been disabled for multiple projects in an organization within a short time period. Impact: VPC Firewall High Priority Block VPC_FIREWALL_HIGH_PRIORITY_BLOCK Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects when a VPC firewall rule that blocks all traffic is added at priority 0. Impact: VPC Firewall Mass Rule Deletion VPC_FIREWALL_MASS_RULE_DELETION Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects the mass deletion of VPC firewall rules by non-service accounts. Impact: Service API Disabled SERVICE_API_DISABLED Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects when a Google Cloud service API is disabled in a production environment. Impact: Managed Instance Group Autoscaling Set To Maximum MIG_AUTOSCALING_SET_TO_MAX Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects when a managed instance group is configured for maximum autoscaling. Discovery: Unauthorized Service Account API Call UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_API_CALL Cloud Audit Logs:
IAM Admin Activity audit logs Detects when a service account makes an unauthorized cross-project API call. Defense Evasion: Anonymous Sessions Granted Cluster Admin Access ANONYMOUS_SESSIONS_GRANTED_CLUSTER_ADMIN Cloud Audit Logs:
GKE Admin Activity logs Detects the creation of a role-based access control (RBAC) ClusterRoleBinding object adding the root-cluster-admin-binding behavior to anonymous users. Initial Access: Anonymous GKE Resource Created from the Internet Preview GKE_RESOURCE_CREATED_ANONYMOUSLY_FROM_INTERNET Cloud Audit Logs:
GKE Admin Activity logs Detects resource creation events from effectively anonymous internet users. Initial Access: GKE Resource Modified Anonymously from the Internet Preview GKE_RESOURCE_MODIFIED_ANONYMOUSLY_FROM_INTERNET Cloud Audit Logs:
GKE Admin Activity logs Detects resource manipulation events from effectively anonymous internet users.
Overview of Event Threat Detection  |  Security Command Center  |  Google Cloud (2024)

FAQs

Overview of Event Threat Detection  |  Security Command Center  |  Google Cloud? ›

Event Threat Detection is a built-in service for the Security Command Center Premium tier that continuously monitors your organization or projects and identifies threats within your systems in near-real time.

What is threat detection investigation and response in the cloud? ›

Threat detection, investigation, and response (TDIR) is a cybersecurity process for finding, analyzing, and mitigating threats. Threat detection is performed through constant system and network monitoring to identify any signs of malicious activity or potential vulnerabilities.

What is Google Cloud security Command Center? ›

Security Command Center is a powerful platform for monitoring data and security risks across your organization or individual projects. Security Command Center is designed to provide maximum protection with minimal configuration being necessary.

What are the tiers of GCP SCC? ›

Security Command Center offers three service tiers: Standard, Premium, and Enterprise. Google Cloud charges only for the Premium and Enterprise service tiers of Security Command Center.

What are the features of a security Command Center? ›

Security Command Center overview
  • Manage threats. ...
  • Manage vulnerabilities. ...
  • Assess risk with attack exposure scores and attack paths.
  • Manage findings and alerts with cases.
  • Define response workflows and automated actions.
  • Multicloud support: Secure your deployments on other cloud platforms. ...
  • Define and manage security postures.

What are 4 methods of threat detection? ›

Here are four popular threat detection methods and how they work.
  • Threat intelligence. ...
  • User and attacker behavior analytics. ...
  • Intruder traps. ...
  • Threat hunting. ...
  • Security event detection technology. ...
  • Network threat technology. ...
  • Endpoint threat technology. ...
  • Security data lake implementation.

What is event threat detection? ›

Event Threat Detection applies detection logic and proprietary threat intelligence, including tripwire indicator matching, windowed profiling, advanced profiling, machine learning, and anomaly detection, to identify threats in near-real time.

What is the most valued GCP certification? ›

Professional Cloud Architect

It's the highest-paying IT certification overall in the U.S. and the most popular Google Cloud certification, according to the IT Skills and Salary survey.

What is the most basic level of GCP certification? ›

Google Cloud certifications are grouped into two: associate and professional certification. Associate certification is for beginners seeking to gain basic skills such as cloud services deployment, while professional certification is for professionals seeking to enhance their design and management skills.

What is the hierarchy in GCP? ›

Google Cloud resources are organized hierarchically, where the organization node is the root node in the hierarchy, the projects are the children of the organization, and the other resources are descendants of projects. You can set allow policies at different levels of the resource hierarchy.

What is the role of SCC in GCP? ›

The GCP Security Command Center (SCC) is Google's built-in security and vulnerability detection solution. It monitors your GCP environment to detect threats such as compromised identities (meshing with IAM), data exfiltration, and misconfigurations.

What is the purpose of a command center? ›

Command centers function as a centralized hub where operations can be monitored, controlled, and executed. Due to the specialized requirements of specific applications, these centers are usually highly secured and meticulously designed to guarantee uninterrupted daily functioning in diverse situations.

What are the benefits of a command center? ›

With Command Center, you can:
  • Manage hundreds of employees, at varying levels, across multiple locations.
  • Improve your company's bottom line with an effective and efficient training program.
  • Minimize callbacks.
  • Increase your retention rate.

What is threat detection and response? ›

Threat detection and response (TDR) defined

Threat detection and response is a cybersecurity process for identifying cyberthreats to an organization's digital assets and taking steps to mitigate them as quickly as possible.

What is cloud detection and response? ›

Cloud Detection and Response (CDR) is the proactive defense against cyber attacks that target cloud infrastructure and data.

What is meant by threat in cloud computing? ›

These services may result in data loss, data oversharing, compliance issues, and more. Insider Threats: Employees or contractors with access to cloud-based systems can intentionally or unintentionally cause data breaches, steal data, or leak sensitive information.

What is threat investigation? ›

Threat investigation is the process of analyzing and evaluating the impact of threats on an organization to develop an incident response plan. Once the threat is detected, security teams conduct forensic analysis of networks, systems, and applications to identify the root cause of the threats.

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